SEMINARS

Webinar by Margaret Kyle, CERNA, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Generic Competition in India"

SPEAKER

Margaret Kyle,

CERNA










DATE

December the 6th, 2022

11:00 to 12:00 London time.


LOCATION

Event will be held online

TECHNIS is pleased to invite you to a free webinar. TECHNIS webinars focus on IP and innovation examining recent legal, economic, managerial, ethical and policy issues related to technological innovation. Our approach is interdisciplinary and presentations are given by experts in different fields such as economics, law, management, STS, sociology, anthropology and philosophy. Webinar presentations last for 20min and are followed by a 40min discussion.


Please join us for a webinar on Tuesday the 6th of December 2022 at 11:00 London time i.e. 12:00 Brussels time, 13:00 Athens time. The speaker is Margaret Kyle, CERNA. The title of the talk isTRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Generic Competition in India"it is joint work with Bhaven Sampat, and Ken Shadlen.


This webinar is free and open to all. The moderator is Dr. Andreas Panagopoulos

Join Zoom Meeting: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/96479541729

Meeting ID: 964 7954 1729


NOTE: To participate please contact Andreas Panagopoulos at least an hour prior to the webinar.


Abstract: Before the 1995 Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, India did not allow pharmaceutical product patents. TRIPS required India (and many other developing countries) to amend patent laws to grant product patents on drugs, raising concerns among policymakers, academics, and advocacy groups that the new patent regime would hinder access to medicines. This paper assesses the impact of TRIPS on competition in India using new and updated data on patents, and exploits the precise institutional details of TRIPS implementation. We argue that a significant effect was unlikely to be immediate in India and most developing countries, and indeed may have been realized only relatively recently. When we focus on the set of drugs fully under the TRIPS regime, those that are eligible for stronger “primary” patent protection, we find large effects of patents on competition. The results are likely to be more representative of the long-run steady state impact of TRIPS in India than are previous estimates.