SEMINARS

Webinar by Christian Kiedaisch, University of Namur: "Time-limited forward patent protection and cumulative innovation"

SPEAKER

Christian Kiedaisch,

University of Namur










DATE

Nov 12th, 2024

11:00 to 12:00 London time.


LOCATION

Event will be held online

TECHNIS is pleased to invite you to a free webinar. TECHNIS webinars focus on recent legal, economic, managerial, ethical and policy issues related to technological innovation. Our approach is interdisciplinary and presentations are given by experts in different fields such as economics, law, management, STS, sociology, anthropology and philosophy. Webinar presentations last for 20min and are followed by a 40min discussion.


Please join us for a webinar on Tuesday the 12th of November 2024 at 11:00 London time i.e. 12:00 Brussels time, 13:00 Athens time. The speaker is Christian Kiedaisch, University of Namur. The title of the talk is "Time-limited forward patent protection and cumulative innovation". 


This webinar is free and open to all. The moderator is Dr. Andreas Panagopoulos


Join Zoom Meeting:

https://uoc-gr.zoom.us/j/84642993639?pwd=4mpCWh3kXwL7TeODcCa7UZ9cKEbbYU.1
Meeting ID: 846 4299 3639
Passcode: 532636


NOTE: To participate please contact Andreas Panagopoulos at least an hour prior to the webinar.


Abstract: This paper studies the effect of the length of forward patent protection on cumulative innovation in a quality-ladder model. Forward protection allows the market leader to block follow-on innovation and to therefore be protected from creative destruction. Attracted by the anticipation of such temporary monopoly power, firms innovate at a higher rate once forward protection of the market leader has expired. Consequently, the rate at which innovation and creative destruction occur becomes cyclical. It is shown that the average rate of innovation is maximal for a finite duration of forward protection. This is because the induced cyclicality of R&D expenditures allows to shorten the average time that lies between R&D expenditures and the earning of monopoly profits and to thereby increase the incentives to innovate. The innovation-maximizing length of forward patent protection is shown to increase if it becomes easier to re-allocate R&D expenditures over time.