Webinar by Pavel Chakraborty: Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure
Lancaster University Management School.
June the 12th, 2018 -
11:00 GMT to 12:00 GMT.
Event will be held online
TECHNIS is pleased to invite you to a free webinar. TECHNIS webinars focus on IP and innovation examining recent legal, economic, managerial, ethical and policy issues related to technological innovation. Our approach is interdisciplinary and presentations are given by experts in different fields such as economics, law, management, STS, sociology, anthropology and philosophy. Webinar presentations last for 20min and are followed by a 40min discussion.
Please join us for a webinar on Tuesday the 12th of June 2018 at 11:00 GMT. The speaker is Pavel Chakraborty, Lancaster University Management School.
The title of the talk is “Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure", (joint with Sourav Bhattacharya and Chirantan Chatterjee).
The moderator will be Dr. Andreas Panagopoulos.
The program we use to deliver webinars is called VSee and you can easily download it for free. A very short demo of VSee can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDb7-Mrz0L4.
This webinar is free and open to all.
To participate and for further information, please contact Dr. Andreas Panagopoulos at least a day prior to the seminar.
Abstract: We use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 in India as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal effect of higher incentives for innovation on firm organizational features. We find that stronger intellectual property (IP) protection has a sharper impact on technologically advanced firms, i.e., firms that were a-priori above the industry median in terms of technology adoption. While there is an overall increase in managers' share of compensation, this increase is about 1.6-1.7% more for high-tech firms. This difference can be attributed to a larger increase in performance pay for high-tech firms. The reform also leads to a significant increase in number of managerial layers and number of divisions for high-tech firms relative to low-tech firms, but only the latter effect is correlated with the differential change in managerial compensation. Broadly, we demonstrate that stronger IP protection leads to an increase in both within-firm and between-firm wage inequality, with more robust evidence for between-firm inequality.